MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT (CHINA AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: SUSAN RICE

SUBJECT:  CHINA AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE

We urgently require your decision regarding our response to China’s recent controversial announcement of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) covering an area of the territorial sovereignty dispute in
South China Sea which has raised great concerns amongst US allies, escalating regional tension for the potential military confrontation. This situation has become one of the critical importance in light of the following:

(i) Allies seeking US clarifications:  We have recently received a message from the government of Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines seeking US actions in response to China ADIZ in the South China Sea.

·           Outlining ASEAN’s Joint Statement to express concern over any “threat” to international civilian aviation, reaffirming the common positions of Southeast Asian nations and Japan on "maritime security" and "freedom of navigation" in international waters.

·           Requesting US diplomatic action and political support in light of international rule of law that could contribute to promoting peace and stability at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.

(ii) Military involvement

·           The Japanese maritime self-defense forces plan to dispatch P-3C patrol aircraft to conduct an extended joint military training in the dispute areas at the Sangley point naval base in the Philippines.

·           Vietnam seeking US deployment of military patrol aircraft at the Da Nang airbase.

·           Intelligence reports from various quarters regarding China's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, training exercises that included circumnavigating the Japanese archipelago and transiting the Spratly Islands.  Intelligence reports also indicate the issuance of an explicit threat against uncooperative foreign aircraft, a reflection of Chinese increasingly assertive territorial claims.

(iii) China’s position

·           State Councilor of the PRC, Yang Jiechi has sought an immediate telephone call with Secretary John Kerry to discuss China’s positions and to discuss concrete measures to mitigate the rising tension.

Key Considerations

(i) Our policy regarding the territorial sovereignty disputes with regards China’s ADIZ in the South China Sea maybe distilled into three main priorities.

·           Prevent war at all cost. An escalation of the tension could lead to military conflict and a potential full scale of war.  We cannot dissuade China from creating an ADIZ, but will caution all sides against unnecessary brinksmanship.

·           Although we can continually emphasis that the 'pivot' to Asia extends beyond military policy, any diminution of that presence will have a major impact on the perception of US strength in the region. The engagement of the US military forces in the South-East China Sea, therefore, remains pivotal to ensure stability in the region.  

·           We can be expected to concentrate our regional policies on maintaining a stable military balance and accept that the local powers, in particular, Japan and ASEAN to assume primary responsibility for the design of the basis for future relations in the territorial sovereignty dispute in South-East China Sea.

(ii) Japanese leaders deny the very existence of a dispute over the islands and Shinzo Abe's foreign policy platform, which rests on the notion of Japanese resurgence, reflects a broader reluctance in Japan to tolerate further perceived Chinese encroachments into Japanese territory.

(iii)  Given the lopsided power asymmetry between China and its Southeast Asian neighbors, neither the Philippines nor Vietnam possesses credible indigenous deterrence against China's prospective announcement of an ADIZ in the South China Sea.

(iv) Judging from past East China Sea ADIZ, China will likely seek to de-escalate tensions without conceding the substance of its assertions or claims. It may scramble fighters to escort foreign planes (rather than threatening them), giving the appearance of asserting authority regardless of whether the planes comply with its regulations.  Later, when it deems circumstances conducive to further advance, it will push forward again.

Policy Options

(I) Prepare for intervention:  Dispatching B-52 bombers as well as deploying air craft carriers through the ADIZ area without following the Chinese regulations. Unlike newer, stealth aircraft,
B-52s are easily identified, suggesting that we want the planes to be noticed to signal our defiance.  However, where possible, refrain from actual military intervention; coordinated effortlessly with allies, notably Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines to conduct joint military training in the dispute area; pressing Manila for an agreement to rotate US marines through a new naval facility under construction at Oyster Bay, which opens to the South China Sea, underscoring that this is a multilateral action.

Advantages:

·        Maintain US leadership role in East and Southeast Asia as a counter balance of power vis-à-vis China rising military power.  Signaling that the US increasing military involvement is a reliable security provider for the region.

·        Since US has relatively few bases in the region and virtually no ground-force presence outside South Korea and Okinawa, the deployment of aircraft patrol in Danang military base can act as a strategic advantage to gain control right at China’s backyard. Taiwan could also act as an unsinkable aircraft carrier and forestall Chinese naval to exert control over the Luzon Strait, the waterway connecting the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea.

·           The military operations allow the US to preserve its good relations with the claimants and maintain a strategic and military foothold within Southeast Asia.  If situation were to escalate, we could immediately launch large scale operations, giving it the ability to interfere anywhere throughout Southeast Asia.

Disadvantages:

·           It is likely that there will be frequent encounters between Japanese and Chinese fighters in the ADIZ.  By sending aircraft into China's ADIZ to challenge China's excessive claims and asserting navigational rights. The worst-case-scenario is a collision that could escalate into a larger conflict if managed badly.

·           We will be indirectly and directly involve in military conflicts as a result of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and US.  It will leave no room for doubt that the Chinese will not back off, as their losing the territorial sovereignty, in particular, the Diaoyu islands, interprets the loss of political legitimacy of the communist party as well as a humiliation against Japanese imperialist. 

·           Once we are engaged in a full scale of military operations, China might utilize nuclear weapons when it is faced with advanced technological weaponry. There will be no international resolution because both China and the US are permanent members of the UN Security Council. A military action against China will have a highly deplorable impact on international security at large. Specifically, we will have to pay a tremendous economic price for taking military action in the South China Sea.

(II) ASEAN as a regional architecture:  Resolving the issue at the multilateral level will be an important test for the US and ASEAN. Both sides must strive to ensure its driving role in the building of the architecture for the regional security and prosperity. China must come to realize that its tough stance on the South China Sea issue is detrimental to its peaceful rise as well as affects the positive attitudes of ASEAN countries toward it. Instead of adopting a confrontational stance, US and ASEAN must seek to engage China by making use of regional mechanisms and tools. In particular, this includes the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).

Advantages:

·      Demonstrate to China the benefits of all claimants working in the rule-based system as ASEAN history of economic and political cooperation with China could greater deter China’s increasing assertiveness. In particular, encouraging all sides to explore diplomatic and other peaceful means towards viable solutions, including through the use of arbitration and other international legal mechanisms.

·      The affirmative position of the US will further complicate the situation in this region, and has internationalized and multilateralized the disputes over the South China Sea, which ultimately will make ASEAN as a whole to lean on the US.

·      Such internationalization of the problem will create greater pressure on the Chinese government. China would also have hardly been comforted by the fact that not a single country in Asia supported its move. This is interpreted as part of a strategic attempt to further isolate China by driving a wedge between China and its stalwart allies in the region, in particular, the non-claimants ASEAN, Burma, Laos PDR, Thailand and Singapore.

Disadvantages:

·      Our relations with Southeast Asia has begun at a low point, after the cancellation of presidential official trip in October 2013 for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and East Asia Summit meetings.  It might be somewhat questionable and difficult for the US to take leadership role as ASEAN could question the US real interests to support ASEAN vis-à-vis with China.

·         As the issue of sovereignty in the South China Sea is actually made up of a number of separate disputes, China would probably remain adamant that it will resolve the South China Sea dispute only through bilateral negotiations rather than facing greater numbers pressure from the ten ASEAN countries.

·         Territorial disputes in the South China Sea continue to expose divisions inside ASEAN. Without a cohesive identity and clear future vision, ASEAN is risking strategic irrelevance and remain at the mercy of great power rivalry between China and the US for regional influence. 

(III) Combination of military measures and constructive engagement with allies:  We should issue press statement that condemns China’s unilateral action that constitutes an attempt to change the status quo. We should support freedom of overflight by flying undeclared military aircraft through it but implicitly support the Japanese and the Philippines joint military exercise. We will not take a position on competing territorial claims, but remain steadfastly committed to our allies, especially support Japan to become regional power, increasing arm trade with allies to meet more of their own security needs indigenously to counterbalance China.  At the same time, support ASEAN leadership and apply confidence building measures such as peaceful means of dispute settlement, joint development area, international law, maritime cooperation and pushing progress toward finalizing Code of Conduct (COC)
Advantages:

·           Underlines the US commitment to encourage the peaceful resolution of potential regional conflicts and engage in an emerging regional architecture of robust institutions to promote regional stability and prosperity.

·           Reaffirms the importance of regional peace and stability, maritime security, unimpeded commerce, and freedom of navigation, in accordance with relevant universally agreed principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other international maritime law, and the peaceful settlement of disputes of South China Sea.

·           A militarily rejuvenated Japan is likely to cause immense strategic problems for China; for which its audacious move in setting up an ADIZ would be largely responsible. One that could serve as a counterweight to China and assist strategic allies such as the Philippines and Vietnam to cope with an increasingly precarious regional environment.

·           US can act as a conflict mediator to support the establishment of a joint development area for the exploitation of natural resources between the claimants in a cooperative efforts and laying aside the issue of sovereignty. Such solution require neither state renounces its maritime claim nor recognize the legitimacy of another state’s while making it possible to address resource problems. 

Disadvantages:

·           Despite the fact that our endeavoring to decline from dispute and reluctant militaristic confrontation, to continue the policy of neutrality, there can be little doubt that our longstanding alliance, and possibly overall security cooperation in Asia would deteriorate.

·           Japan with military and political power corresponding to its economic power could potentially be a much less reliable alliance partner. A powerful Japan will probably raise another security problem adding to the complexity of the inter-related issues of the rising power of China and the Korean reunification prospects.

·           Since any joint exploration of natural resources in the continental shelf will necessary require direct involvement of the concerned governments. In the midst of constant political pressure from China, any cooperatives efforts between the claimants for the joint development in the sea-bed remains problematic.

Recommendation: Option III: The third options is the preferred, for the following reason:

(i)  There is too much at stake in their bilateral relations for the US and China to adopt harsh antagonistic postures. Option III is viable not only it is an appropriate combination of contingency actions enabling us to deter further deterioration of the situation but the multilateral efforts providing us with long-term policy to mitigate the rising tension. By focusing on diplomatic, military support and multilateral efforts, we can effectively ensure containment and isolation policy vis-à-vis China.

(ii)  Any policy option that overreacted to China's recent foreign policy have failed to address adequately the constraints that domestic politics place on Xi Jinping’s power in the international arena.  The increasing pressure by the hardliners in the communist party combined with the growing public disappointment on how the government has handled the South China Sea disputes has influenced Xi to adopt a more confrontation stance towards its neighbors. Nevertheless, Chinese sabre-rattling is often a reflection of domestic sentiment and a form of public appeasement. Xi knows well that China does not have the capability to wage a real war against its neighboring countries while also trying to maintain domestic social stability. He may show a tougher stance in territory disputes with other Asian countries, but it is superficial, and when it comes to relations with the US, he will try to avoid direct confrontation.